Adrian Cowderoy

Obsessive secrecy in intelligence agencies – the dangers

Mine in Death Valley, USA

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Obsessive secrecy dominates the work of intelligence agencies as well as some areas of commercial intelligence. Obsessive secrecy is one of the top 5 ethical challenges.

  • How to recognise someone with access to intelligence secrets.
    Start a conversation about intelligence matters in front of them. They go to lengths to avoid saying anything meaningful.
A mine in Death Valley USA - secret and potentially dangerous
A mine in Death Valley USA – secret and potentially dangerous

Obsessive secrecy encourages bad behaviour

The habit of prioritising secrecy above everything means people can be hurt, laws broken, and missions compromised. Working for a prolonged period in a culture of secrecy changes behaviour and it can distort beliefs and values. Obsessive secrecy can bring out the worst of people.

Yet for some people, the inherent conflicts of working in secret intelligence brings out the best in them. See my 2-page story “The assassination“.

Secrecy is used to cover mistakes

The emphasis on secrecy beyond hiding collected intelligence and people, and includes everything about their operations and how they work. It’s not just extreme competitiveness, but a need to protect individuals and control the information flow in complex Counter Intelligence (CI) cases. Deciding what can be safely released is time-consuming and risky, forcing a culture of “Always Secret”.

For an example of secrecy-first, see my story “The price of secrecy-first“.

The secrecy laws are draconian

The culture within intelligence is to make everything secret, even when it does not need to be. That way everyone knows the rules, and it cuts across the stress people are under.

  • Intelligence argument: It’s fair and effective.
  • Human consequences: The fear of breaking secrecy can be terrifying.

See my 2-page story “Reputational risk – a forced confession“.

Can it be improved?

It has improved in the past.

  • There was a time when intelligence methods were treated with the same secrecy as technical capabilities, but now intelligence methods are the subject of academic study.
  • Cases and insights are often leaked to the press, and intelligence chiefs occasionally make public appearances and announcements.
  • From the start of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, MI6/SIS have release Twitter/X posts of bullet-point summaries that used to be Classified.

It can improve again.

  • Secrecy rules could be reduced for trained intelligence officers in specific situations.
  • More cases could also be released.
  • There could be closer working with trustworthy online and print authors.

“The future of counter-intelligence: the twenty-first-century challenge”, by Arthur S. Hulnick. Chapter 5 of The Future of Intelligence, Challenges in the 21st century, Taylor & Francis, 2015. https://www.routledge.com/The-Future-of-Intelligence-Challenges-in-the-21st-century/Duyvesteyn-Jong-Reijn/p/book/9781138951952